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Big 0 v. Goodyear: The Case for
Trademark Disparagement?
By SHEILA DOLAN*
Each of us receives any abstract or general notion in the
context of the individual mind, and we therefore under-
stand and apply it in different ways.
A general or subjective understanding of the meaning of words
does not appear to have hindered the development of either pys-
chology or literature; one need only consider, for example, the
wealth of conjectural material which has been written about the
dark lady of Shakespeare's sonnets.2 Lawyers and judges, however,
should not be encouraged to cloud issues with speculative rhetoric
and innovative ambiguities. The less than precise presentation of a
legal theory results in confusion for listeners and readers, and pro-
vides no guidance for those who rely on the value of precedent and
the power of stare decisis. It is essential that the words used to
convey legal concepts be free of unwanted, unnecessary connota-
tions and outdated or incorrect implications. Otherwise, as T.S.
Eliot warned, the words shift and break, unable to take the strain.
On the other hand, it is sometimes tempting to use ambiguous lan-
* Member, Class of 1981.
1. JUNG, Approaching the Unconscious, in MAN AND His SYMBOLs 28 (C. Jung ed. 1964).
2. A brief selection of works referring to the dark lady includes: W. CAREW HAZLirr,
SHAKESPEAR: HIMSELF AND His WORK 247, 257-58 (4th ed. 1912); S. SCHOENBAUM, SHAKE-
SPEARE's LIVEs passim (1970); I. BROWN, THE WOMEN IN SHAKESPEARE'S LIFE passim (1969);
2 G. BRANDES, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: A CRITICAL STUDY passim (republ. 1963); S.
SCHOENBAUM, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: A DOCUMENTARY LIFE passim (1977); SIR S. LEE, A
LIFE OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 194-95 (rev. 4th ed. 1925); F.E. HALLIDAY, SHAKESPEARE 116-
18 (1961); P. QUENNELL, SHAKESPEARE: A BIOGRAPHY 130-32, 145 (1963); M. FIDO, SHAKE-
SPEARE passim (1978); H.C. GODDARD, THE MEANING OF SHAKESPEARE 393, 581 (1951); G.B.
Shaw, The Dark Lady of the Sonnets, in SELECTED ONE AcT PLAYS 175 (Penguin ed. 1972);
S. BOOTH, SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS 434, 549 (1977).
3. T.S. ELIOT, THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 121 (1971); this segment is taken from
Burnt Norton, the first of the Four Quartets:
Words strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still.
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guage if only because it is imprecise: it need not be fully developed,
but rather can be left to imagination and subjective understanding.
When the United States District Court in Colorado rendered its
decision in Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Co.,' one of two theories of liability on which Big 0 prevailed,
trademark disparagement, was hailed as a unique cause of action.
Although this tort has been known by various other names, the
cause of action is merely unfamiliar rather than original or unprec-
edented. This note will explore the sound reasons for its gradual
disappearance from the modern legal scene and, in the context of
the Big 0 decision, demonstrate the perils of using an outdated
concept when a clearer, more modern theory is available. Using
trademark disparagement as the basis for the judgment unnecessa-
rily cluttered a potentially clean, simple decision based on the cur-
rent theory of trademark infringement. Trademark disparage Ient
is so clouded by its confusing historical development and improper
usage that it is probably in the best interests of the legal and busi-
ness professions that it fall back into disuse. This conclusion is
based on two grounds: first, that the use of this appellation may
understandably mislead other courts in the future, and second,
that the proper ground for decision, the theory of trademark in-
fringement, will be overlooked and therefore inadequately devel-
oped as a basis for subsequent decision.
I
Trademark Disparagement and Its Modern
Renaissance in Big 0
The action was originally brought in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado, jurisdiction predicated on diver-
sity of citizenship. The plaintiff, Big 0, was a Colorado corporation
with its principal place of business in Englewood, Colorado; defen-
dant Goodyear was an Ohio corporation which maintained its
headquarters in Akron, Ohio. The complaint, filed in November,
1974, alleged Big O's common-law ownership of the trademark BIG
FOOT for automobile tires and asserted a claim for relief from
Goodyear for unfair competition by false designation of origin' in
4. 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D.C. Colo. 1976) (Matsch, J.).
5. Annual Review, Part III, Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition, 68 T.M.
REP. 778, 780 (1978).
6. Pursuant to § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1976). For cases decided
on this statutory ground, see Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America v. Solar Sound Systems,
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connection with Goodyear's use of BIGFOOT7 to identify its tires.
Common-law trademark infringement was also alleged.8 The issue
of trademark disparagement, while not alleged in the complaint or
the amended pleadings, was held to have been tried by implied
consent of the parties.'
While the issues of false designation of origin and trademark in-
fringement are not directly addressed in this note, the facts on
which these theories are based are necessarily substantially related
and will be mentioned as they arise.10
The plaintiff, Big 0, was a tire-buying organization formed in
1962 for the purpose of supplying independent retail dealers in
fourteen states with "private brand" Big 0 tires, merchandising
techniques, advertising and operating systems." The member re-
tailers identified themselves to the public as, Big 0 dealers. In
1973, Big 0 commissioned the manufacture by Uniroyal of two tire
models, identified on the sidewall as Big 0 BIG FOOT 60 and Big
0 BIG FOOT 70. The first interstate shipment of these tires took
place early in 1974; sales to the public through Big 0 dealers began
in April, 1974. Big O's total net worth at the time of trial was ap-
proximately $200,000.
The defendant, Goodyear, is the world's largest tire manufac-
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868, rehearing denied,
423 U.S. 991 (1975); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F.
Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
7. BIG FOOT is the form used by Big 0; BIGFOOT is the spelling used by Goodyear. 408
F. Supp. at 1222 n.1.
8. This was not the confusion-of-source or passing off normally involved in a trademark
infringement complaint exemplified by Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969
(2d Cir. 1948) and Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970). Big
0's case constituted reverse confusion-of-source, or reverse passing off, as it was explained
in Annual Review, 68 T.M. REP., supra note 5, at 780: "In the usual infringement case the
plaintiff has the established product and the public believes that defendant's product
originates with plaintiff. Here, the situation was reversed. While plaintiff had the prior
right, the confusion resulting from Goodyear's action would most likely cause the public to
believe that Big O's BIG FOOT tires originated with defendant." For another case involving
reverse passing off, see John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
afl'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Donosio Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587
F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978). See also Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1310
(1940), where this cause of action is termed "upsidedown passing off."
9. 408 F. Supp. at 1224.
10. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) a state claim of unfair competition may be joined
with a substantial and related claim under the federal trademark laws. To be related, how-
ever, the unfair competition claim must rest on substantially identical facts.
11. The facts have been taken from 408 F. Supp. at 1223-31.
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turer. It sells tires not only to dealers in the replacement market,
but also to automobile manufacturers as original equipment for
new cars. In early 1974, Goodyear began production of a new radial
tire with the name "Custom Polysteel Radial" molded onto the
sidewall. For the replacement market, Goodyear expected to trade
on the claim that the new tire performed better under wet weather
conditions than its other tires, and hired an advertising agency to
develop a name to emphasize the width and traction which gave it
better wet weather performance. The agency suggested the name
BIGFOOT. A search revealed no conflicting registered trademark,
and Goodyear launched a massive multi-media advertising cam-
paign, focusing on the word BIGFOOT. The promotion began on
September 16, 1974, during ABC's Monday Night Football tele-
cast.'2 By the time of trial, Goodyear had spent almost ten million
dollars on its BIGFOOT campaign;13 much of the publicity stated
that BIGFOOT tires were available only from Goodyear.
For an appreciation of the complexities and the equities of the
case, it is necessary to refer to the time preceding the trial. In Au-
gust, 1974, Goodyear first learned of Big O's use of BIG FOOT."' A
Goodyear exective, soliciting a consent which would preclude a
cause of action for trademark infringement, promptly requested a
letter from Big 0 stating that the company had no objection to
Goodyear's use of the term BIGFOOT. Big 0 executives, however,
objected strongly to such use and disclaimed any interest in pay-
ment in exchange for the right to use the mark; instead, they re-
quested that Goodyear discontinue its use and wind down the cam-
paign. A Goodyear executive reminded the president of Big 0 that
while Goodyear wished to avoid litigation, if Big 0 did sue, the
length of time usually involved in litigation might allow Goodyear
to obtain all the benefits it had anticipated from the use of the
mark. Big O's response indicated that its organization would be
severely damaged should its dealers conclude that Big 0 could not
12. The following excerpt from a videotaped speech given at a Goodyear sales promotion
meeting reveals Goodyear's motive for starting on this date: "Suffice it to say, that what all
this means is that we will reach about 80 percent of all the males in the USA about five
times a month all during the fall introductory period. You think they won't know about
BIGFOOT? You bet they will!" 408 F. Supp. at 1226.
13. Id. at 1231.
14. A Goodyear district manager, returning from a late August BIGFOOT promotional
meeting in Los Angeles, noticed a Big 0 BIG FOOT tire on a car in Salt Lake City, Utah.
He immediately conveyed this information to the Goodyear headquarters in Ohio. 408 F.
Supp. at 1227.
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protect its exclusive right to the BIG FOOT trademark.1 5 The par-
ties did not communicate further; Big 0 subsequently filed suit for
damages and requested a temporary restraining order and a pre-
liminary injunction, both of which were denied.
The case was tried to a jury on three theories: trademark in-
fringement, false designation of origin, and trademark disparage-
ment. The jury found for Big 0 on the claims of liability for trade-
mark infringement and trademark disparagement. Goodyear
prevailed on the claim for false designation of origin. General com-
pensatory damages were assessed at $2,800,000 and punitive dam-
ages at $16,800,000.1 The general compensatory damages were os-
tensibly the amount required to conduct a corrective advertising
campaign." The special verdict indicates that the jury found that
Big 0 had proved no special damages. 8 It was the largest verdict
ever handed down in a trademark case and perhaps one of the
largest in any tort case in history.'
Goodyear appealed from the verdict; the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment but reduced the award for compen-
satory damages to $678,302 and the award for punitive damages to
$4,069,812.0 In 1978, the United States Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari.2 The district court stated in its opinion that these dam-
ages were available under either of the two theories of liability on
which Big 0 prevailed," a statement which will be shown to be, at
best, open to question.
15. Id. at 1227-28.
16. Id. at 1224.
17. See Schaefer, Money Recovery in Trademark and Unfair Competition Cases, in CUR-
RENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADEMARK LAW AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 247, 250 (1978) for a
practical approach to using future corrective advertising as a measure of the client's damage.
For a further analysis of this concept, see J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE
§ 5.09[4] (1977 Supp.).
18. "We [the jury] find that plaintiff has proven special compensatory damages in the
amount of $ None." 561 F. 2d at 1367. "The 'special' verdict is a statement by the jury of
the facts it has found. . ." Black's Law Dictionary 1399 (5th ed. 1979). Regarding the pur-
pose and content of special verdicts, see 76 Am. JUR. 2d Trial §§ 1175-1218 (1975).
19. Annual Review, Part III, Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition, 66 T.M.
REP. 400 (1976).
20. 561 F. 2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977) (Lewis, C.J.).
21. 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
22. 408 F. Supp. at 1224.
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II
Historical Development of Trademark
Disparagement
At first blush, the theory of trademark disparagement appears to
relate to the law of trademarks, perhaps under either the common
law or the Lanham Act. However, a more than cursory analysis of
the phrase itself reveals an alternative, clarifying grammatical con-
struction: when considered as disparagement of a trademark, the
field of examination is revealed as disparagement of an intellectual
property right. Intellectual property includes patent rights, copy-
right, and the right to use trademarks and trade names. 3
The language of the Big 0 court, however, is not calculated to
clarify any misconceptions one might have in this area:
[T]he wrong done to Big 0 is properly characterized as a defama-
tion of the reputation of the corporation. If special damages must
be shown for disparagement of property such a requirement
should not apply to cases where, as here, the injury is the
equivalent of common law character defamation."'
This statement, equating disparagement with defamation and
merging their requirements and remedies, amply demonstrates the
vagueness and confusion which have long surrounded the tort of
disparagement.15
A. Disparagement in General
Disparagement, in its ordinary sense, is defined as indignity, dis-
grace, or a diminution of esteem or standing." In its legal sense, it
is defined as a "matter which is intended by its publisher to be
understood or which is reasonably understood to cast doubt upon
the existence or extent of another's property in land, chattels, or
intangible things, or upon their quality."2 7 For the most part, the
23. See W.B. ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL & SLANDER 70 (6th ed. 1929). See
also F. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS
157-58, 171 (1925); J.L. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION 13 n.22 (1905).
24. 408 F. Supp. at 1235.
25. For a detailed account of disparagement from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centu-
ries, and of the problems then confronting jurists, see G.S. BOWER, A CODE OF THE LAW OF
ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 209-11 nn.y, z & b (2d ed. 1923).
26. WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 653 (3d ed. 1966).
27. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 422 (5th ed. 1979).
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Second Restatement of Torts's and case law29 are in accord with
this legal definition when the action is properly characterized as
disparagement of property.
It is generally recognized that the tort of disparagement consists
of two independent branches: disparagement of title and dispar-
agement of quality.30 These actions originated at different times in
order to redress different wrongs, but each constitutes disparage-
ment of property.
Disparagement of title to property can be found under many dif-
ferent names depending on the circumstances and the general un-
derstanding of the moment: slander of title,1 injurious falsehood,
unfair competition," deceit," misappropriation," and slander of
property.ae The most common is slander of title, although
respected legal scholars urge its abandonment.37 Its use has been
discouraged for the most part because of its misleading, inappro-
priate, "and 'doubly unfortunate'38 " similarity to the oral form of
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 629 (1977).
29. See, e.g., Hill v. Allan, 259 Cal. App. 2d 470, 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 676, 689 (1968): "Dis-
paragement or slander of title is a publication made without a privilege or justification of
matter that is untrue and is disparaging to another's property in land, chattels or intangible
things under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct
of a third person as a purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined thereby and that
results in pecuniary loss from the impairment of vendability [sic] thus caused." See also
notes 31 and 33, infra.
30. See generally Wood, Disparagement of Title and Quality, 20 CAN. BAR REV. 296, 430
(1942).
31. Bliss v. Stafford, Owen 37, 74 Eng. Rep. 882 (C.P. 1573). Lands were settled on X in
tail, remainder to plaintiff Margaret Bliss in fee. X being a childless old man, plaintiff was
about to sell her remainder to Y when defendant Edward Stafford intervened and asserted
that X had a living son. Y then refused to purchase the remainder, as its title in Margaret
Bliss had been "slandered," or disparaged.
32. See J. SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS 528-32 (15th ed. 1969); Prosser, Injurious False-
hood: The Basis of Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 425 (1959).
33. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 106 F. 2d 229, 231 (10th Cir. 1939);
McAllister v. Stumpp & Walter Co., 55 N.Y.S. 693, 25 Misc. 438 (1898); Nims, Unfair Com-
petition by False Statements [of] Disparagement, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 63 (1934).
34. F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTs.310 (11th ed. 1920): "The wrong called Slander of
Title is in truth a special variety of deceit. . . ."
35. Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 932 (1964). This
article contains a good discussion of competitive commercial torts in general.
36. Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 COLum L. REV. 13, 121 (1913).
37. See F.M. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 454 (4th ed. 1926); Smith supra note 36; W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 916-26 (4th ed. 1971); ODGERS, supra note 23.
38. G. S. BOWER, supra note 25, at 210 n.y.: "[Tihe still surviving but wholly inappropri-
ate designation, 'slander of title,' proves doubly unfortunate. . . . It was owing to the use of
the word 'slander' that the form of action in question was confused with defamation proper,
and was, moreover, thought to be limited to oral defamation; and it was owing to the use of
233No. 2]1
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defamation. However, although there are contrary views," most
prognosticators believe that its use will most likely continue."'
The earliest reported case of slander of title arose in 1573" and
concerned real property. The first case of slander of title to in-
tangibles was heard in 186942 and is considered the precedent for
modern disparagement of title actions relating to intellectual
property.
Disparagement of quality of property, commonly known as trade
libel,"' was developed separately from disparagement of title be-
cause of a need to distinguish between a false statement concern-
ing the quality of one's goods and one concerning the title to them.
This tort has been identified by a variety of names, including com-
mercial disparagement," trade libel,' unfair competition by dis-
paragement,"0 and disparagement of property.'7 The use of the
the word 'title' that it was supposed first to relate to land only, and then to title to goods
only, and not to their qualities."
39. Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46, 51 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819 (1951):
"[I]t did contain what was formerly known as slander of title but is now usually called
disparagement of title."
40. BURDICK, supra note 37, at 454: "The name is not a fortunate one, and has operated
at times to confuse counsel and courts. It might well be exchanged for the term 'Disparage-
ment of Property,' but there is little probability of accomplishing such exchange"; PROSSER,
supra note 37, at 916: "Undoubtedly the best and most inclusive name for the tort is that of
'injurious falsehood'. . . but it cannot be pretended that thus far the courts have seen fit to
make any use of it."
41. See note 31, supra. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 624, Comment a
(1977): "The earliest cases in which it arose involved oral aspersions cast upon the plaintiff's
ownership of land, as a result of which he was prevented from selling or leasing it; and the
decisions went upon an analogy to the kind of oral defamation of the person that is action-
able only upon proof of special harm."
42. Wren v. Weild, L.R. 4 Q.B. 730 (1869). This case involved statements made to plain-
tiff's customers that plaintiff was infringing defendant's patent. A non-suit was declared
because there was no evidence of malice.
43. Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs., Inc., 269 F.2d 375, 385 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 893 (1959); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 475 (1956); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 616 (1977).
44. Janssen, Commercial Disparagement, 53 T.M. REP. 274 (1963).
45. Schmoldt v. Oakley, 390 P.2d 882, 884 (Okla. 1964). The alleged disparagement oc-
curred when defendant parked his car in the vicinity of plaintiff's automobile dealership,
where it was originally purchased. Defendant hung lemons on the car, and displayed a large
sign which read: "HAVE A REAL LEMON - BUY THIS PONTIAC BY GENERAL
MOTORS ED 3-4607 FOR DETAILS."
46. See H. NIMs, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION & TRADE-MARKS 850 (4th ed. 1947);
Nims, Unfair Competition by False Statements [of] Disparagement, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 63
(1934). See also Bourjois, Inc. v. Park Drug Co., 82 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1936) and American
Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d
160 (2d Cir. 1978).
47. See Hibschman, Defamation or Disparagement?, 24 MINN. L. REv. 625, 631 (1939-40).
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term libel in reference to this tort seems particularly inappropriate
since a requisite element of libel, a defamatory statement, is not
required for disparagement."'
Actions for disparagement of quality as unfair competition are
often brought in connection with defamation proceedings if the
disparagement of the quality of the goods is made so as to imply
business dishonesty or incompetence on the part of the plaintiff."
If a false and unprivileged statement causes injury in one's busi-
ness, trade or profession, it is actionable as libel per se.50 Big 0,
however, did not proceed on a theory of libel per se, although
statements of the trial court judge provide some indication that
there was evidence to support such an action." A showing of spe-
cial damages would not be necessary in an action for libel per se,"
wheras it has been, until Big 0, a requirement for disparagement."
The origins of this commercial disparagement of quality are not
clear; it is generally believed that it first appeared as an indepen-
dent tort in 18741" and, because of its origins, has been character-
ized as the child of slander of title."
48. See Note, Extension of Injurious Falsehood: Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 35 CORNELL
L.Q. 899, 900 (1950).
49. In Rosenberg v. J.C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 609, 86 P.2d 696 (1939), defendant,
a rival clothing store, put a sample of plaintiff's merchandise on storefront display with a
placard reading in part: "This Garment is either a poorly made second or prison-made mer-
chandise." Id. at 613, 86 P.2d at 699.
50. In Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc. 389 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1967), a newspaper
gossip columnist published a false nine-year-old story regarding the prominent attorney's
stay in Florida at the expense of the Florida bar. "A libel per se is one that is defamatory on
its face, including a publication that is susceptible of several meanings, one of which is de-
famatory; it is actionable without proof of special harm." Id. at 581-82. See Hibschman,
supra note 47, at 631: "The rule to be discerned . . . seems to be that a statement is mere
disparagement of property and not defamation of the owner or manufacturer where it does
not impute dishonesty, fraud, lack of integrity or reprehensible conduct to such owner or
manufacturer in connection with the property, goods, or product referred to in the objec-
tionable language, but constitutes defamation when it ascribes such conduct to an owner."
51. See note 24 and accompanying text, supra.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977): "One who falsely publishes matter
defamatory of another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel is subject to
liability to the other although no special harm results from the publication."
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 624, Comment a (1977): "[P]roof of special harm
is required in all cases." See also ODGERS, supra note 23, at 66: "He must prove his whole
case; there is no presumption to lighten his burden."
54. Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chem. Manure Co., L.R. 9 Ex. 218 (1874).
55. See Developments in the Law - Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REV. 888, 893 (1964).
For a good article on this subject, see Comment, Trade Disparagement and the "Special
Damage" Quagmire, 18 U. OF CH. L. REV. 114 (1950). For cases involving disparagement of
quality, see Eversharp, Inc. v. Pal Blade Co., 182 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1950); Testing Systems,
Inc. v. Magnaflux Corp., 251 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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B. Disparagement Distinguished From Defamation
As in the case of Big 0, disparagement is often equated with an
action for defamation." Indeed, the same fact situation may give
rise to both causes of action concurrently." The same privileges
and defenses apply to both torts,5  but the differences between
them are fundamental: the action of defamation is intended to pro-
tect one's reputation while the action for disparagement is
designed to protect one's interest in the vendibility of property or
property rights. Courts have always imposed different require-
ments on plaintiffs bringing actions for disparagement as opposed
to those bringing suits for defamation. There are, for example, dif-
fering burdens of proof. For disparagement, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the falsity of the statement as an element of the
cause of action; for defamation, truth is a matter to be proved by
the defendant.59 Disparagement requires a greater degree of fault
on the part of the defendant-in modern terms, a showing of mal-
ice; for defamation, malice is a required element only in certain
cases.10 In the area of special damages, courts have been uniformly
56. See note 24 and accompanying text supra. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 624, Comment a (1977) describes the probable origins of this confusion: In slander of title
cases, "[t]he association with personal defamation through the word 'slander' has unfortu-
nately tended to lead the courts to regard the plaintiff's property interest as somehow per-
sonified, and so defamed, and thus to look to the law of defamation."
57. "This happens particularly in cases of disparagement of the plaintiff's business or
product. If the statement reflects merely upon the quality of what the plaintiff has to sell or
solely on the character of his business, then it is injurious falsehood [disparagement] alone.
Although it might be possible to imply some accusation of personal incompetence or ineffi-
ciency in nearly every imputation directed against a business or a product, the courts have
insisted that something more direct than this is required for defamation. On the other hand,
if the imputation fairly implied is that the plaintiff is dishonest or lacking in integrity or
that he is perpetrating a fraud upon the public by selling something that he knows to be
defective, the personal defamation may be found. . . . Action may be brought in the same
suit for both torts, however, as long as the damages are not duplicated." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 623A, Comment g (1977). See also National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas
Motor Fuel Co., 20 F.2d 763 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 570 (1927); Burkett v. Griffith,
90 Cal. 532, 27 P. 527 (1891).
58. For the privileges and defenses to defamation, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 583-92A (1977); these include truth, consent, and circumstances where the performance
of a duty requires or allows the publication of defamatory matter. According to §§ 634-35 of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, the privileges and defenses which apply to disparage-
ment are essentially identical to those for defamation.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A, Comment g (1977).
60. Where a public official or public figure is libelled, malice must be shown. See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In libel cases not involving public officials
or public figures, a finding of negligent failure to ascertain the truth of the statement is
sufficient.
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stringent in requiring detailed allegations in disparagement cases,"
while only those defamation cases which are neither libel per se
nor slander per se require such a showing."2 The disparaging mate-
rial need not be defamatory. 8 Disparagement generally survives
the death of the plaintiff, since the disparaged property or prop-
erty right continues to exist; defamation does not normally survive
the death of the defamed individual or entity. 4
Defamation, in the form of either libel or slander, may be con-
sidered as one type of disparagement, since the term is sometimes
used in its definition." It is essential, however, that defamation
and disparagement be recognized as distinct and separate torts. As
previously discussed, the forms of defamation known as slander
and libel and the branches of disparagement termed slander of
title and trade libel have obvious semantic similarities. This simi-
larity of sound should not be understood to imply a similarity of
the underlying legal doctrines, as this may lead to a misapplication
of the law.
III
Elements of the Tort of Disparagement
A. Traditional Elements Contrasted With Elements
According to the Big 0 Court
The four elements traditionally essential to an action for dispar-
agement are a written or oral publication" of a false*7 statement;
malice;68 and special damages.69
61. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 922 (4th ed. 1971): "The (special dam-
age) which the plaintiff must always plead and prove as an essential part of his cause of
action means a pecuniary loss." Id. at 918: "[Pjroof of damage is essential to the cause of
action [of disparagement]." See also Fowler v. Curtis Publ. Co., 182 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir.
1950). For a discussion of the distinctions between special and general damages, see McCoR-
MICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 8 (1935).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 569-70 (1977) for definitions of these terms.
63. See Note, supra note 48, at 900.
64. See generally Menefee v. CBS, Inc., 458 Pa. 46, 329 A.2d 216 (1974).
65. 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 271 (8th ed. 1974).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 630 (1977) for publication requirement.
67. See, e.g., McNichols v. Conejos-K Corp., 29 Colo. App. 205, 482 P.2d 432 (1971).
68. See, e.g., Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
920 (1960).
69. See, e.g., National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F.2d 763 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 275 U.S. 570 (1927); Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Labs., 17
F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1926). See generally 50 Am. JUR. 2d Libel & Slander §§ 541-51 (1970),
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 633 (1977).
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As previously noted, the court in Big 0 described disparagement
in terms of defamation." In its instructions to the jury, however,
the defamation connotation was omitted, and only a slight, but not
insignificant, variation from the traditional elements of disparage-
ment was set forth. According to the court, the plaintiff had the
burden of proving the following elements:
1) that the defendant published some false statement or state-
ments to the plaintiff's customers or potential customers which
could reasonably be understood to cast doubt or confusion on the
validity of plaintiff's trademark;
2) that the defendant acted with malice; and
3) that such false statements had an adverse economic effect
upon the plaintiff's business.7'
B. Traditional Elements of Disparagement as Ap-
plied to Big 0
The first requirement for a cause of action based on disparage-
ment of title is an "injurious falsehood" 7' published7 3 to Big O's
customers or potential customers which could reasonably be under-
stood to cast doubt or confusion about the validity of Big O's
trademark. A common form of disparaging another's property in
tangibles is by express denial of the other's title;74 another com-
mon form is the indirect or implied denial of another's title by the
assertion of an inconsistent title in oneself or in a third person.
Big 0 is an example of the latter; by asserting that BIG FOOT was
available only from Goodyear, it was implied and understood that
there was no concurrent use with Big O,76 or with any other tire
70. See note 24 and accompanying text supra. See also 408 F. Supp. at 1247 where the
court informed the jury that trademark disparagement "is somewhat like injury to a per-
son's reputation through defamation."
71. 408 F. Supp. at 1248.
72. See PROSSER, supra note 37, at 916; for further elaboration, see Note Injurious False-
hood - An Expanding Tort, 33 GEO. L.J. 213 (1944-45).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 630 (1977) for the requirement of publication.
74. Barkhorn v. Adlib Associates, 203 F. Supp. 121 (D. Hawaii (1962).
75. Bliss v. Stafford, Owen 37, 74 Eng. Rep. 882 (C.P. 1573); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 629, Comment c (1977); Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press, 106 F.2d 229 (10th
Cir. 1939); McAllister v. Stumpp & Walter Co., 55 N.Y.S. 693, 25 Misc. 438 (1898), where
the action was based on concurrent proprietary rights, defendant having asserted a false
claim of exclusive right.
76. 408 F. Supp. at 1229: "[W]hen a Big 0 dealer attempted to place a display ad in the
yellow pages of a telephone directory, using the phrase 'Home of BIG FOOT,' the telephone
company's representative told him that it could not be done because the name BIGFOOT
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company, and that, by its use, Big 0 was infringing Goodyear's
mark. The claim of exclusivity by Goodyear was false and multiple
publications were evident; the first requirement was therefore met.
The second requirement is a finding that Goodyear acted with
malice." The jury necessarily found malice in Goodyear's conduct
in order to find for Big 0 on this issue. Whether Goodyear's ac-
tions met this requirement was a question of fact within the prov-
ince of the jury,7" but whether the jury applied the correct legal
definition of malice is another question entirely.
Malice is a philosophical concept which is not often legally ap-
plied in its ordinary sense of ill-will or spite.7' Despite the Big 0
court's jury instructions,o only in its non-technical, literal sense is
malice ordinarily construed as meaning to vex, injure or annoy. In
its legal sense,si and therefore in cases involving trademark dispar-
agement, malice refers only to the intentional commission of a
wrongful act without justification or excuse." As an indication of
the modern definitional trend, the Restatement avoids the term
"malice" when explicating disparagement." In any event, whether
the term was applied in its literal sense, as instructed by the court
and found by the jury, or in its legal sense, for which there was
adequate evidence, malice was attributed to Goodyear's acts as re-
quired by the definition of disparagement of title.
belonged to Goodyear."
77. For historical notes on malice, see Van Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of
Defamation, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 35 (1904).
78. 561 F.2d at 1373.
79. Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B&C 247, 254-55 (1825): "Malice in common acceptance means
ill-will against a person. . ."; HARPER, THE LAW OF TORT § 274 (1933): "[M]alice, in the
actual sense of the term, is not important at all, except to defeat the defense of privilege or
to enhance damages."
80. 408 F. Supp. at 1248.
81. 50 AM. JuR. 2d Libel & Slander § 544 (1970): "[I]t means only that the act is deliber-
ate conduct, without probable cause." See also Gates v. Utsey, 177 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1965): "In an action for slander of title, 'malice' merely means a lack of legal justifica-
tion and is said to be 'presumed' if the disparagement is false, if it caused damage, and if it
is not privileged." For a slight variation, see Comment, Trade Disparagement and the
"Special Damage" Quagmire, supra note 55, at 116 n.13: "Malice is frequently said to be
essential to the action but it appears rather to mean the absence of privilege." See also Hill
v. Allan, 259 Cal. App. 2d 470, 66 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1968) for an example of failure to prove
malice resulting in dismissal of an appeal in a disparagement of title case.
82. 50 Am. JUR. 2d Libel & Slander § 544 (1970). In a defamation case, New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964), the United States Supreme Court defined "ac-
tual malice" to mean that the statement was made with actual knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard as to whether it was true or false.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A, comment d (1977). See also Paramount
Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 106 F. 2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939).
No. 2]1 239
CoMM/ENT LAW JOURNAL
The third element, the requirement of special damages, poses an
interesting question: did the court in its instructions to the jury
extend this traditional requirement to include any "adverse eco-
nomic effect"?84 The court declined to define "adverse economic
effect" except to describe it as being "far more inclusive than spe-
cial damages."85 Historically, courts have consistently insisted on
allegations and proof of special damages in disparagement ac-
tions," possibly because of the analogy with the requirements for
slander.8 7 A number of cases provide exceptions" but, absent any
of those exceptions, the necessity of proving special damages re-
mains a requirement. Proof of special damages can be an ex-
tremely difficult burden to meet, especially where courts insist on
more than an assertion of general harm or proof of a general de-
cline in business.89 The court in Big 0 expressly dismissed the re-
quirement of special damages by stating that "as a matter of policy
84. 408 F. Supp. at 1248. The court at 1235 discusses Den Norske Amer. Actiesselskabet
v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 226 N.Y. I, 122 N.E. 463 (1919) and Ira M. Petersime &
Son v. Robbins, 81 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1936) in support of the contention that expenses of
counteracting business disparagement constitute special damages (emphasis added). But
see Landstrom v. Thrope, 189 F.2d 46 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819 (1951), where
relief was denied in an almost identical situation due to failure to allege special damages;
MacAllister v. Stumpp & Walter Co., 55 N.Y.S. 693, 25 Misc. 438 (1898), where plaintiff was
entitled to an injunction only; and Pendleton v. Time, 339 Ill. App. 188, 89 N.E. 2d 435
(1949), where no recovery was allowed because there were no special damages.
85. 561 F. 2d at 1374.
86. For a historical review of the requirement of special damage, see Carroll v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 405, 407-08, (S.D.N.Y. 1937): "It is apparent, therefore, that
the allegation of special damages is essential to the sufficiency of a cause of action based
upon slander of title. The slander is not applicable in the absence of special damages."
87. Kendall v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 14, 18 (1851): "The cause of action in this case is denomi-
nated slander of title, by a figure of speech, in which the title to land is personified, and
made subject to many of the rules applicable to personal slander, when the words in them-
selves are not actionable."
88. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939), where
the court found an alternative tort-inducing a breach of contract-on which to base liabil-
ity, and therefore did not strictly observe the special damage requirement. For other excep-
tions, see Note, Extension of Injurious Falsehood, supra note 48, at 900: "Another excep-
tion to the strict general rule [requiring special damages] is found in cases where there is an
element of unfair competition," such as in George v. Blow, 20 N.S.W.L.R. 395 (1899), a case
of disparagement by omission to mention the competitor's product, thereby falsely stating
"We are the only photographers supplying the rococo, as it is our own production." Id. at
395.
89. See note 61 and acompanying text supra. The case for special damages for disparage-
ment actions was first argued in Malachy v. Soper, 3 Bing. N.C. 371 (1836). It has been
strictly adhered to thereafter: Fowler v. Curtis Publ. Co., 182 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Shaw Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932);
Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1949), and Eversharp, Inc. v. Pal
Blade Co., 182 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1950).
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there is no reason to require special damages in a business dispar-
agement case."90 However, it had previously stated that the special
damage requirement had in any case been met because Big 0 had
suffered unnamed but measurable adverse economic effects.91 The
court acknowledged that Big 0 could not submit proof of direct
financial loss or out of pocket expenses,9 2 which are normally con-
sidered special damages.
Had the court chosen to emphasize interference with a property
right or unfair competition, concepts which subsume disparage-
ment,9" the special damage requirement might have been avoided.
In actions for unfair competition, the requirement of proving spe-
cial damages is generally conceded no longer to apply.9 However, a
blanket inclusion of disparagement of title within the scope of un-
fair competition neither alters its essential character nor negates
the authority requiring proof of special damages.95 From the
court's decision, one of four assumptions can be drawn: First, the
court in Big 0 did not consider itself bound by prior judicial inter-
pretations of the three traditional requirements for the cause of
action known as disparagement, and thereby set a new precedent
where proof of special damages would no longer be required if the
action is characterized as business disparagement. Second, proof of
special damages remains a requisite element though in this case
damages were presumed, perhaps because of the supposed rela-
tionship between disparagement and defamation where special
damages are often presumed. Third, the cost of corrective advertis-
ing, an admittedly legitimate expense qualifying as special dam-
90. 408 F. Supp. at 1235.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939).
94. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 45.4 (1968): "In actions
for unfair competition . . . the plaintiff need not show special damages; present or probable
injury will suffice." See also Edwin L. Wiegand Co. v. Harold E. Trent Co., 122 F.2d 920 (3d
Cir. 1941); Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937).
95. The difficulties for the plaintiff inherent in retaining the special damage requirement
are well demonstrated in Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Labs., Inc., 17 F.2d
255 (8th Cir. 1926), the leading case for impossibility of allegations of specific customers
were the dissemination was widespread; Barkhorn v. Adlib Assocs., 203 F. Supp. 121 (D.
Hawaii 1962) where the owner of the property was required to allege the names of inquirers
who become disinterested or persons who refrained from buying after the alleged disparage-
ment, or to allege the impossibility of making such allegations; in Testing Systems, Inc. v.
Magnaflux Corp., 251 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1966), the court held that in order to avoid the
necessity of pleading special damages, plaintiff must show that the disparaging statement
constitutes libel per se.
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ages,96 was the measure of the special damage requirement, even
though Big O was not in a financial position to implement a correc-
tive campaign, and did not in fact conduct one. Or fourth, had the
case been tried solely on the disparagement theory, Big 0 could
not have prevailed because of its failure to plead and prove special
damages. However, the court in no way indicated which, if any, of
these assumptions it favored. As a result, the basis underlying the
holding of the case is ambiguous and thus open to subjective
interpretation.
The trademark disparagement claim and its attendant confusion
would have been eliminated by an exclusive allegation of trade-
mark infringement. Under either the common law in the case of an
unregistered trademark or under the statutory scheme for a feder-
ally registered trademark," the standard required for a finding of
trademark infringement is merely the likelihood of confusion, mis-
take or deception as to the origin of the goods.98 Although Big 0
cited instances of actual confusion," such examples need not be
demonstrated in order to find liability for either common-law or
Lanham Act infringement;100 the likelihood of such confusion will
suffice. Where such instances have occurred, however, they are
generally regarded as indications that the likelihood-of-confusion
standard has been met.101 The actual consumer confusion demon-
strated by Big 0 was sufficient to support the jury's finding of
infringement.
96. See Ira M. Petersime & Son v. Robbins, 81 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1936).
97. The definition of a trademark as given in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976) "includes any word,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
others" (emphasis added).
98. E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 253 (1975).
99. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
100. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co., 180 F. Supp. 534 (D.C.
Okla. 1959); Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 429 (D.C.N.Y.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 281 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1960); Application of Marriott Corp.,
517 F.2d 1364 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Clairol, Inc. v. Roux Labs., Inc., 442 F.2d 880 (C.C.P.A.
1971).
101. See E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 90, at 267. The basic test to determine
whether confusion is likely is found in In re Dupont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357
(C.C.P.A. 1973), where the court succinctly states: "Clearly, a right to use is not a right to
confuse." Id. at 1364. For types of relief available in an action for trademark infringement,
see generally 74 Am. JUR. 2d Trademarks & Tradenames §§ 145-46 (1974).
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IV
Conclusion
It is not at all certain whether, given Big O's lack of proof or
even allegation of special damages,"' another court would have up-
held the company's claim for trademark disparagement. Big 0
failed to allege any loss in trade as a result of Goodyear's dispar-
agement, and it may be considered a misunderstanding on the part
of the trial court to have refused to instruct the jury that proof of
special damages was required. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit re-
fused to follow two Colorado cases cited as precedent by Goodyear
on the grounds that they were slander of title cases.103 As this note
has attempted to show, this is precisely the action to which the
court should have addressed itself, even had the quite adequate
theory of trademark infringement not been alleged.
The misuse of the trademark disparagement theory is under-
standable, since the tort historically has been such a fertile source
of confusion. It therefore should be employed only where no other
cause of action applies. In all other cases, reasoned decisions will
be facilitated by use of the more modern concepts of trademark
infringement and unfair trade practices. Ambiguous phraseology is
especially tempting when equity rather than law is the strongest
point, yet such ambiguity leads to confusing decisions which have
little, if any, precedential value. Although trademark disparage-
ment can be a valid theory, its usefulness in Big 0 is none too
clear. Rather than fully awaken disparagement of title from its
fitful slumber, courts would do best to let sleeping dogs lie.
102. 408 F. Supp. at 1230: "[T]here is no evidence that any direct economic losses re-
sulted. The plaintiff did not produce evidence of lost sales of Big 0 tires or any other type
of lost income. Moreover, the evidence is clear that no dealers were lost and, indeed, new
dealers were added to the organization during the time of this concurrent use."
103. The cases cited by Goodyear were Zimmerman v. Hinderlider, 105 Colo. 340, 97 P.2d
443 (1939): "In an action for damages for slander of property of title, 'In order to show that
the words uttered have caused injury to the plaintiff, it is generally necessary to aver and
show that they were uttered pending some treaty or public auction for the sale of the prop-
erty, and that thereby some intending purchaser was prevented from bidding or competing."
Id. at 348, 97 P.2d at 447; and McNichols v. Conejos-K Corp., 29 Colo. App. 205, 482 P.2d
432 (1971): "The elements of the tort of slander of title are: slanderous words, falsity, mal-
ice, special damages." Id. at 209, 482 P.2d at 434. Plaintiff was in possession of property,
deeds of trust to which were held by defendant. Intending to foreclose, defendant told pro-
spective purchaser of his ability to deliver merchantable title. Plaintiff failed to prove any
elements of slander of title.
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